For anyone who cares about the governance of the UK, the Covid Inquiry makes for uncomfortable reading, not because its conclusions are particularly shocking but because they confirm what many inside government have known for years. The British state entered the pandemic with public services already in a fragile position after a decade of austerity, with a centre of government poorly equipped to manage complex systems and an operating model that was prone to malfunction whenever sustained cross-government action was needed.
If we take the inquiry’s findings seriously, its lessons go far beyond the inadequacy of emergency planning. They go to the heart of how the UK should design its centre of government, while pursuing long-term reform of public services to achieve greater resilience in the face of an external environment more prone than ever to crises and shocks. The imperative of reform speaks directly to the concept of the agile strategic state we are elaborating through our work.
We have built the state for events, not systems
The inquiry reveals a centre of government that defaulted to ad hoc improvisation once the crisis moved beyond the initial COBR phase. Structures multiplied. The cabinet was pushed to the margins. Real decisions were taken in small, informal meetings in No.10. Committees were invented to fill gaps in clarity and authority. The system coped but it did not lead or drive delivery.
The same pattern is visible in peacetime. The UK has a centre that reacts to shocks but rarely shapes the system. It announces missions but lacks the operating model to deliver them. It manages crises well enough to survive but struggles to steward and guide long-term priorities.
A strategic state requires the opposite approach: a clear decision-making framework, a stable chain of authority, alongside structures that endure beyond the dominant personalities of the moment. When these essentials are absent, chaos ensues, as was the case in the initial phase of the pandemic response.
Preparing for the wrong pandemic reveals a deeper problem
The inquiry concludes that in fact the UK “prepared for the wrong pandemic”. Planning was based on an influenza outbreak, not the real vulnerabilities that would determine the impact of Covid: chronic disease, social inequality, local variation and the fragility of the social care system. Public services were already operating at or beyond safe capacity.
This is not just a pandemic story. It illuminates how reform fails more generally. Too often, government builds systems based around preferred futures rather than the actual structures and organisations it has. Policymakers assume steady demand and stable capacity, even as the evidence shows increasing volatility and uncertainty in patterns of service use.
If the centre wants to lead public service reform, it must stop planning for ideal conditions and start planning for the system as it actually is: complex, uneven, interdependent and vulnerable. That is the essence of strategic statecraft.
Evidence and challenge were uneven and incomplete
Scientific advice during Covid was structured and visible. Economic, social and distributional analysis was weaker, less transparent and often produced late in the day. The impacts on vulnerable groups were underassessed until after decisions were made.
This imbalance still shapes public service reform. Technical policy advice remains strongest. Economic modelling, behavioural insight and social analysis are often peripheral. Reforms fail not because the ideas are flawed but because the system cannot see or test the full consequences early enough.
A strategic centre would correct this by treating economic, social and distributional evidence as of equal importance to policy advice, building formal challenge into major decisions and programmes while making impacts on vulnerable groups part of the starting point rather than an afterthought.
Centre-local relations must become part of the state’s core operating model
The inquiry is clear: central government did not use local insight or local data effectively. Local authorities and public health teams were often brought into decisions too late or inconsistently.
This is not a crisis-management issue. It is the daily reality of public service reform across the UK, especially England. Most of the outcomes government cares about come from local systems. NHS recovery, adult social care, children’s services, community safety, homelessness and the effort to achieve net zero targets all depend on local capacity and local judgement.
A strategic centre must therefore build a new operating model that treats local systems as equal and expert partners, not subservient delivery arms. That means shared outcomes, joint data standards, clear escalation routes and regular feedback from local to national. Without this, reform remains theoretical and unable to progress in practice.
Data is not plumbing, it is strategic capability
The inquiry repeatedly highlights the impact of fragmented, inconsistent and slow data analysis during the pandemic. The centre lacked real-time visibility of risk and performance. National and local systems could not connect. Decision making suffered as a result.
Exactly the same weaknesses hold back public service reform today. Without shared data, shared standards and interoperable infrastructure across health, care, education, policing and local services, the centre cannot lead reform. It can only react.
Any credible vision of a strategic state rests on modern data capability. Without it, ambition is outgunned by reality.
From improvisation to intention
Covid demonstrated that the British state can act decisively when required to do so. But the inquiry also shows that action came despite the system, not because of it. That distinction matters.
In our previous articles, we have insisted that the centre must move from an ad hoc, personality-driven operating model to one based on clear goals, hard choices, shared accountability and long-term stewardship. The inquiry reinforces that argument. It shows what happens when coherence is absent and when political and administrative rhythms do not align. It also shows what becomes possible when urgency forces alignment. The task now is to create that alignment without a crisis.
What the centre must do next
The implications of this analysis are that decision-makers must:
- Create a stable, cross-government decision framework for long-term priorities, not only for emergencies.
- Build a centre that leads systems rather than reacting to events.
- Integrate economic, social and distributional evidence into every major decision.
- Treat local systems as equal partners in design and delivery.
- Build shared data infrastructure as national strategic capability.
This is the practical foundation of a truly strategic state: coherent, resilient, agile and capable of delivering the best outcomes for citizens and communities at scale.
The Covid Inquiry makes the failings and imperfections of the current model of UK governance impossible to ignore. The challenge now is to build a centre of government that can deliver reform deliberately, coherently and with the discipline that long-term change demands.