Academics at King’s College London think existing procedures for appointing independent policy advisers are too lax, and lead to bad government. Colin Marrs examines their proposals, and gathers the opinions of former tsars.
When retail ‘tsar’ Mary Portas appeared before parliamentarians earlier this year, she confessed that she had been naïve in believing that the government would act on her recommendations aimed at reviving British high streets. And research conducted by King’s College London shows that Portas is not the only tsar to have found her role ill-defined – or, indeed, ultimately fruitless. This is particularly worrying because tsars play a growing role in policy formation: last week, King’s Department of Political Economy revealed that 300 tsars have been appointed since 1997 – 118 of them in the three years since the coalition’s formation.
In response, a new policy institute at the college has produced a draft code which it says should govern the role of independent policy advisers (IPAs). The code has no formal status, but has been released in order to provoke debate – and, perhaps, to nudge the Cabinet Office into taking action to formalise arrangements for such appointments.
Dr Ruth Levitt, a visiting senior research fellow at King’s and the code’s co-author, says the current system lacks transparency and accountability. “Our research found that many IPAs were appointed just through one informal chat, without anything on paper,” she explains. “There is a great deal of guidance relating to public appointments that ministers can refer to and sometimes they don’t do it on tsars. Why is the appointment of tsars considered differently to other appointments?”
Levitt also criticises “inadequacies” in the accountability of IPAs. “Currently, tsars are not subject to any existing codes of practice, and arrangements are vulnerable to opaque procedures,” she says. “In choosing to appoint tsars, ministers are able to avoid any existing codes of practice that govern the recruitment, conduct and outputs of all other sorts of advisers.” The case for reform, she adds, fits snugly with government proposals to create more open policymaking.
Her solution, the four-page draft code, covers the appointment process, as well as mechanisms to assess the performance of tsars. It says that the appointment and conduct of independent policy advisers should be subject to the seven principles of public life, as set out by the 1996 Nolan Report into standards in public life (selflessness, integrity, objectivity, accountability, openness, honesty, and leadership).
The code calls for departments to nominate a senior responsible officer for the appointment of all their IPAs. The SRO would be responsible for the preparation of draft terms of reference for the post: the code suggests these might include the specific remit and purpose of the role; the degree of independence they will enjoy; the reporting requirements to ministers; and remuneration and termination arrangements.
Recruitment need not involve an open competition “if that would be a mere formality”, although the minister or responsible officer should hold an interview with the candidate, with any offer of a position made in writing. Once made, the appointment should be announced in a government press notice and communicated to the relevant select committee chair. In addition, “the minister should make an explicit statement explaining why the appointment of an independent policy adviser is the most effective means of obtaining the advice he or she needs.”
Openness should govern the work of the tsars once in post, and “only reasons of security or confidentiality should justify working secretively,” the code states. On completion of their term, IPAs would be required to submit a final report. Information on the progress of their work should be published in departmental annual reports, and departments would be required to report on the strengths and weaknesses of previous appointments.
Asked whether attempts to codify the role would produce additional layers of bureaucracy, Levitt argues that the code is not a rigid framework, but adds that “good standards should not be an optional – they are an essential.”
Former tsar John Hills, professor of social policy at the London School of Economics – who’s worked in various advisory roles for this government and the last – believes that the new code could be useful in clarifying the degree of independence which comes with the post. “I was very strict that our reports were only seen by government when they were out of the printers,” he recalls. As a member of the commission led by Adair Turner to examine pensions, Hills learnt to ensure that such issues are always clarified at the outset – but he suggests that the existence of a code could help less experienced individuals to consider and protect their independence.
This view is reinforced by Otto Thoresen, the government’s former savings tsar, who says: “There was a certain naïvity in terms of how I joined. I wasn’t sure what I was bringing to the table and I would have benefited from knowing more clearly.” Dame ‘Steve’ Shirley, who in 2009 and 2010 served as the UK’s ambassador for philanthropy, agrees – though she also notes that the lack of guidance gave her a “tabula rasa” that enabled her to mould her role in the way she felt was most effective.
However, serial tsar Sir Stephen Boys Smith fears that the adoption of a code could undermine the flexibility permitted within the current framework. “Throughout the four exercises I was involved in, informality was at the heart of it,” he says. “The terms of reference were given, but they were always negotiable in the light of experience.”
According to Peter Waller, a former civil servant and now honourary researcher at University College London’s Constitution Unit: “The code puts things back into the hands of the civil servants to negotiate. I think a lot of civil servants will use it to slow things down and stop new thinking.” And Sue Lewis, the civil servant who led the team supporting Don Cruickshank in his independent review of competition in UK banking markets, which reported in 2000, reveals that Cruickshank battled against civil servants who wanted to control his review: “It was incredibly difficult because my fellow civil servants had a different view of what independence meant than Don,” she says. Both are concerned that a code would enable civil servants to reduce tsars’ ability to explore new ideas.
Bernard Jenkin, chair of the Public Administration Select Committee, expects the code to be ignored by ministers – but his committee and others, he says, will find it useful as a yardstick when scrutinising departments’ tsar appointments. The Cabinet Office’s response suggests that Jenkin’s assessment is accurate: “We think it’s important to maintain a degree of flexibility in such appointments particularly since they may be required to made at short notice,” a spokesperson says.
However, Levitt strongly rejects the idea that the proposed code would tie up the appointment and operation of tsars in red tape. “We agree with the need to retain flexibility, but that doesn’t mean a lack of propriety,” she says, arguing that the code “can be flexible, and not over-prescriptive.” Her text’s wording, she adds, is not set in stone but a vehicle to provoke debate – and, she hopes, action from the key players: the Cabinet Office and the Commissioner for Public Appointments.